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IS ORDEAL BY DISCOVERY OVER?
DISCOVERY BY TELEPHONE AND
CONFERENCE: NEW PRETRIAL
TECHNIQUES CONSIDERED
FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS ADOPTED
BY THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS
COURT
JOEL M. WACHS*
INTRODUCTION

Sometime in the first half of this year, the Supreme Court is
expected to "prescribe" new rules for "the practice and procedure of the district courts." 1 In light of the extensive review to
which these rules have already been subjected, 2 there seems lit* J.D., Columbia University School of Law (1972). Mr. Wachs is presently the Law Assistant to the Honorable Frederick Landis, Judge of the
United States Customs Court. The author assisted in the preparation of the
recent revisions of the Customs Court Rules.
1. The Supreme Court possesses this power to prescribe rules for congressional enactment. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
2. The initial impetus for review of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arose at what has become known as the "Pound Conference," part of
the country's bicentennial celebration cosponsored by the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Conference of Chief Justices, and the American Bar Association. The Conference, formally entitled the "National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice," was held in April, 1976 in St. Paul, Minnesota. Roscoe
Pound had delivered an address on the same topic to the A.B.A. in St. Paul
in 1906.
Much of the Pound Conference was devoted to studies of the mounting
costs of discovery. Two months later, in June 1976, a "follow-through task
force" was established by the A.B.A. to prepare recommendations for the
annual meeting of the Association's Board of Governors in August.
The task force reported the obvious:
Substantial criticism has been leveled at the operation of the rules of
discovery. It is alleged that abuse is widespread, serving to escalate the
cost of litigation, to delay adjudication unduly and to coerce unfair settlements. Ordeal by pretrial procedures, it has been said, awaits the
parties to a civil law suit.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF POUND CONFERENCE FoLLow-UP

TASK FORCE 28 (Aug., 1976) (footnote omitted). The blue-ribbon task force
urged consideration of the problem by the A.B.A. Litigation Section. This
referral was made and, consequently, a large portion of the new rules is
attributable to the Litigation Section. Further discussion of the evolution of
the new rules appears in footnote 10.
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tle likelihood of Congressional objection. 3
Most of the rule changes involve minor revisions of existing
federal rules of civil procedure. Two of the additions, however,
may mark important milestones in federal practice. One new
rule would specifically permit deposition by telephone; the second would allow parties to engage in a "discovery conference."
The provision for deposition by telephone should expedite and
improve pretrial procedures, while the discovery conference potentially could have a significant impact in curbing discovery
abuse.
Effective January 1, 1980, 4 the United States Customs
3. Congress' role is 'set forth as follows:
Such rules [prescribed by the Supreme Court] shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice at or after
the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first
day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been
thus reported.

28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
4. All nine judges of the Customs Court were present on October 26,
1979, at a special meeting to consider amendments to the court rules. At
this meeting, the judges promulgated the following "Statement of the Court
in Adopting the Rules":
That the following amendments and additions to the Rules of the
United States Customs Court shall take effect on January 1, 1980, and
shall govern all proceedings in actions brought thereafter. They shall
also govern all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to
the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action then pending would not be feasible or would work injustice,
in which event the former procedure applies.
In addition, whenever a party is required or has been requested
prior to the effective date of the following amendments and additions to
perform an act, pursuant to the Rules of this Court in effect prior to
January 1, 1980, the act may still be performed in accordance with the
Rules in effect prior to January 1, 1980.
13 Cust. B. & Dec. No. 51, Dec. 19, 1979, at 13.
The judges' language is a slight improvement, due to the breakup of
sentences, over that customarily used in transition rules concerning the effective date of amendments to court rules. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 86(e)
and a similar order of the Supreme Court of the United States dated April
26, 1976, found in HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RULES OF PROCEDURE
COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc.

No. 94-464, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1976).
The final sentence of the Customs Court order apparently is new and
may be somewhat contradictory to the preceding one. In the last sentence,
which concerns actions pending on the effective date, the court has ordered
that "whenever a party is required or has been requested prior to the effective date ... to perform an act ... the act may still be performed in accordance with the Rules in effect prior to January 1, 1980." Yet the second
sentence of the order, which also concerns actions pending on the effective
date, appears to state that the new rules "shall also govern all further proceedings," unless the court orders otherwise.
On rare occasions, transition rules are litigated. New Orleans Pub. Belt
R.R. v. Wallace, 173 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1949); John R. Alley & Co. v. Federal
Nat'l Bank, 124 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1942); see Preston v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 174
F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 829 (1949). Oddly, the first Customs
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Court,5 an article III court 6 with nationwide 7 jurisdiction, 8 beRules Decision published this year presented a transition difficulty. In Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc. v. United States, - Cust. Ct. -, Cust. B. & Dec.
Vol. 14, No. 2, at 59, C.R.D. 80-1 (1980), the defendant moved for summary
judgment prior to filing an answer. Under the current Customs Court
Rules, such a motion is appropriate, but under Customs Court Rule 8.2(a)
in effect until December 31, 1979, summary judgment could be sought only
"at any time after a responsive pleading has been filed." Judge Newman
stressed that the statement set forth at the outset of this footnote applied to
"further proceedings" not "pending proceedings." Since both the motion
for summary judgment and the opposition were filed prior to January 1,
1980, consideration was "premature." Judge Newman added: "Under these
circumstances, it is clear that the new rule has no application in this case,
and in any event its application would 'work injustice' to plaintiff." Id. at 68
n.6.
5. The United States Customs Court, an outgrowth of the Board of
General Appraisers, was established in 1926. 19 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1976). The
Board had been created by the Customs Administrative Act of June 10, 1890
to review decisions by the collectors of customs as to the ad valorem rate
and amount of duty. The Board also considered determinations of government appraisers of merchandise as to the value of imported goods and reviewed some other administrative actions. Act of June 10, 1890, ch. 407, 26
Stat. 131.
Apparently, only one published book discusses this history. See W. H.
FUTRELL, THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN CUSTOMS JURISPRUDENCE (1941). The
Clerk of the Customs Court has prepared a more modern publication. J.E.
LOMBARDI, THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS COURT-A HISTORY OF ITS ORIGIN

AND EVOLUTION (1976) (in Customs Court Library). A third history appears
in Johnson, The United States Customs Court-ItsHistory, Jurisdiction,and
Procedure,7 OKLA.L. REV. 393 (1953). An unpublished and undated history
is on file in the Customs Court Clerk's Office. See Kinstler, A Short History
of the United States Customs Court. For general information about the
Customs Court, including some history, see Rao, Customs Administration
and Law, 25 FORD. L. REV. 77 (1956). See also R. STURM, A MANUAL OF CUSTOMS LAw (1980).
At the present time, Congress is considering expanding the jurisdiction
of the Customs Court and changing the court's name. S.1654, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979). The bill passed the Senate on December 18, 1979. On February 20, 1980, hearings concluded in the House Judiciary Committee. H.R.
6394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). If the legislation is enacted, the court will
be known as the United States Court of International Trade. The breadth of
the anticipated legislation, the "Customs Court Act of 1980," is outlined in
the bill's "purpose" section:
TITLE I-PURPOSE
Sec. 101. The Congress declares that the purposes of this Act are(a) to provide for a comprehensive system of judicial review of
civil actions arising from import transactions, utilizing, whenever possible, the specialized expertise of the United States Customs Court and
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and ensuring uniformity afforded
by the natural jurisdiction of these courts;
(b) to assure access to judicial review of civil actions arising from
import transactions, which access is not presently assured due to jurisdictional conflicts arising from the present ill-defined division of jurisdiction between the district courts and the customs courts;
(c) to provide expanded opportunities for judicial review of civil
actions arising from import transactions;
(d) to grant to the customs courts the plenary powers possessed
by other courts established under article III of the constitution; and
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came the first court in the country to adopt a specific procedural
(e) to change the name of the United States Customs Court to the
United States Court of International Trade to be more descriptive of its
expanded jurisdiction and its new judicial function and purpose relating to international trade in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 251 (1976).
6. For a similar congressional enactment regarding the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), see 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1976). The CCPA
serves as the appellate court for Customs Court decisions. The ultimate
arbiter, of course, is the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v.
United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978). But such review is rare.
The road to article III recognition, assuming that has been achieved,
has not been an easy one for the Customs Court. In 1929, only three years
after the Customs Court came into existence, the Supreme Court held that
the Court of Customs Appeals, the CCPA's predecessor, was a legislative
rather than a constitutional court. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438
(1929). For a discussion of the distinction between courts, see C.A. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]. This
distinction was followed ten years later by the courts of appeal for the
fourth and seventh circuits in cases concerning respectively, a judge of the
Customs Court and a judge of the CCPA. Magruder v. Brown, 106 F.2d 428
(4th Cir. 1939); Bland v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1939). Both
judges, Brown and Bland, had challenged the imposition of federal income
taxes on their salaries.
After Congress had declared the CCPA an article III court in 1958, the
Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530 (1962). The same result was reached with respect to the status of
the Court of Claims. The two cases combined in Zdanok arose under the
statutory authority permitting assignment of judges of one court to sit on
another. 28 U.S.C. § 293(a) (1976). A judge of the Customs Court may be
assigned to a district court, id. § 293(b), or the CCPA. Id. § 293(d). The
Zdanok decision is discussed in 76 HARV. L. REV. 160 (1962); 37 TuL. L. REV.
144 (1962). Justice Douglas dissented, for himself and Justice Black, noting
that "[t]he decision in these cases has nothing to do with the character,
ability, or qualification of the individuals who sat on assignment," but that
the CCPA was a "legislative" court nevertheless. 370 U.S. at 589.
Even the five member majority was split. Only seven Justices heard
the case. Three justices, in an opinion written by Justice Harlan, concluded
that Bakelite, "long ... considered of questionable soundness," should be
overruled. Justice Clark, concurred joined by Chief Justice Warren, commenced his opinion by declaring specifically:
I cannot agree to the unnecessary overruling of Ex parte Bakelite
Corp .. .. and Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). [ Williams
concerned the Court of Claims.] Both were unanimous opinions by
most distinguished Courts, headed in the Bakelite case by Chief Justice
Taft and in Williams by Chief Justice Hughes.
370 U.S. at 585. To emphasize not only the unanimity in the earlier decisions, but the quality of the bench as well, a footnote citation in the above
paragraph advises the reader that at the time of Bakelite, the Court was
composed of Justices Taft, Holmes, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis,
Sutherland, Butler, Sanford and Stone.
What ultimately persuaded Clark and Warren to concur in Zdanok was
the intervening 1958 statute, in which Congress declared the CCPA an article III court. By contrast, the Harlan view maintained that the CCPA was a
constitutional court even prior to 1958. There is no doubt today that the
CCPA is an article III court.
While the Supreme Court did not consider the Customs Court's status
in Zdanok, or subsequently, there appears to be no reason, certainly under
the rationale of the majority in Zdanok, why the lower court should not be
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rule permitting deposition by telephone, and the second 9 to proconsidered an article III court. Wright states that such a conclusion is
"probably" true. WRIGHT, supra, at 36.
After Bakelite, but prior to the 1956 congressional enactment declaring
the Customs Court an article III court, the Second Circuit spoke inconclusively on the issue. Brooks v. Mandel-Witte Co., 54 F.2d 992, 994 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 286 U.S. 559 (1932). Following Bakelite and the 1956 legislation,
but prior to Zdanok, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit anticipated the Harlan-Clark majority split: "We do not
decide, however, whether the expression of congressional intent is sufficient to transform the customs courts into Article III tribunals." Eastern
States Petroleum Corp. v. Rogers, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 63, 280 F.2d 611, 614,
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 891 (1960).
Since Zdanok, at least three of the circuits have sidestepped the question of the Customs Court's status. J.C. Penney v. United States Treasury
Dep't, 439 F.2d 63, 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Argosy Ltd. v.
Hennigan, 404F.2d 14, 20 (5th Cir. 1968); Kocher v. Fowler, 397 F.2d 641, 643
(D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 920 (1968). Nevertheless, the Customs
Court should be considered an article HI court. 1 FULLER, CUSTOMS LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 137 (1979).
Certainly that is how the Customs Court judges view their court. Then
Chief Judge Nils A. Boe wrote in Consolidated Merchandising Co. v. United
States, 375 F. Supp. 1356, 1360, 72 Cust. Ct. 308, 312, C.R.D. 74-7 (1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 527 F.2d 640, C.A.D. 1164 (1976): 'The United States Customs Court is a duly constituted court of the United States, declared to be a
court established under Article III of the Constitution of the United States."
Writing for a three-judge court including Judge Ford in Borneo-Sumatro-Trading Co. v. United States, 49 Cust. Ct. 510, 514 A.R.D. 150 (1962),
Judge Rao wrote that "this is a duly constituted court of the United States,
declared to be a court established under Article HI of the Constitution of
the United States, .

.

. clothed with all the inherent powers of a Federal

district court, and authorized to apply the same rules of evidence, practice
and procedure." But cf. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 67
Cust. Ct. 328, C.D. 4292 (1971), affd, 60 C.C.P.A. 85, C.A.D. 1086, cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973) (Judge Rao possibly changed his mind.)
Finally, the "Customs Court Act of 1980," if passed, will reaffirm the article III status of the court, and this is particularly persuasive in view of the
Supreme Court's Zdanok decision. If enacted in its present form, 28 U.S.C.
§ 251 will be amended to read:
The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, a chief judge and eight judges who shall constitute a court
of record known as the United States Court of International Trade. The
Court is a court established under article HI of the Constitution of the
United States....
7. Officially and physically, the United States Customs Court is located
at One Federal Plaza in New York City. 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1976). Periodically,
legislation is introduced to open a second clerk's office in Los Angeles.
S.1707, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 7350, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
As in the formative years of the Supreme Court, the Customs Court
judges "ride circuit." According to Charles Wright: "As early as 1792, Chief
Justice Jay and his associates joined in a memorial to the President in
which they protested that the task of circuit riding was 'too burdensome.'
WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 4. In 1921, members of the Board of General Appraisers, the predecessor of the Customs Court, still were protesting:
Do you consider the fact that we are nomads, that we have to leave
home and be away most of the time, travelling all over the country, and
putting up with all sorts of treatment-travelling under a time limit all
the time, with no comforts except what we pay twice our allowance for?
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vide for a discovery conference. These new discovery rules were
adopted, practically verbatim, from the Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure' ° of the
Judicial Conference of the United States."
Every federal circuit and district court is represented at the
annual Judicial Conference. The United States Court of Claims
and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' 2 are also represented. The Customs Court, however, is not a member of the
conference. This has permitted the court to adopt the Standing
Committee's recommendations earlier than other courts, which
Hearings on General Tariff Revision Before the House Comm. on Ways &

Means, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 4200-06 (1921). Some of the Customs Court
judges still experience this inconvenience today.
Customs Court judges may conduct trials anywhere in the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 256(a) (1976). Most trials actually are held at the port
city of entry of the contested merchandise, or at the Customs Court in New
York. An examination of the trials held during 1979 demonstrates that just
over fifty percent were held in New York City.
Since many imports enter at more than one port, for evidentiary reasons trials may be held at more than one site. The Chief Judge of the court
may authorize a judge to preside at evidentiary hearings in certain foreign
countries. Id. § 256(b). Customs Court Rule 2.2 delineates the mechanism
for such an evidentiary hearing. The most recent case in which such a procedure was utilized was Dolliff & Co. v. United States, 455 F. Supp. 618 (Cust.
Ct. 1976), affd, 599 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1979), in which Judge Richardson
conducted a hearing in Canada.
8. The jurisdiction of the Customs Court is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1582
(1976). The most recent expansion of the court's jurisdiction occurred in
1979 as a result of the Tokyo Round of the multilateral trade negotiations.
See The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39 (1979). As noted
previously, the jurisdiction of the court may soon be extended even further.
9. Effective January 10, 1977, the Supreme Court of Kansas adopted a
general discovery conference rule, KAN. CT. R. 60-2702a, Rule 136. Thus far,
the rule has not been interpreted by the judiciary.
10. The committee will be hereinafter referred to as the Standing Committee. The specific proposed amendments were first propounded by the
Section of Litigation of the A.B.A. in October, 1977, in a publication entitled
"Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse." The
first effort by the Standing Committee was published in 77 F.R.D. 613 (1978).
The Proposed Amendments referred to here were released in February,
1979. COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. AND P., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE FED. R. Clv. P., 80 F.R.D. 323 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as the REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFT].

11. Congressional authorization for the Judicial Conference of the
United States appears at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976). The Judicial Conference
forwarded the Standing Committee's Proposed Amendments, with revisions not relevant here, to the Supreme Court during the first week of November, 1979.
12. Legislation now pending, the Federal Courts Improvement Act,
would merge the CCPA and the Court of Claims. S. 1477, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1979). The new court would be known as the Court of Appeals for
International Trade, Patents and Trademarks.

19801

Discovery by Telephone and Conference

must await Judicial Conference review and consideration by the
Supreme Court and Congress.
The adoption of these two new discovery rules, telephone
and conference, in the United States Customs Court is of particular significance due to the nationwide jurisdiction of this court.
The principal problem in the area of discovery in the Customs
Court has been procrastination. This court handles cases primarily in the international trade arena, making discovery a timeconsuming task with great distances being involved. The possibilities for abuse by delay are self-evident. It is for this reason
that the potential impact of these new procedures will be much
greater in the Customs Court than in federal practice generally.
Both new rules are designed to help eliminate delay by granting
to the court tighter control over the discovery process.
DEPOSITION BY TELEPHONE
Depositions by telephone are equally permissible under the
federal and Customs Court procedural rules. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 29, Stipulations Regarding Discovery Procedure,
allows the parties by written stipulation to agree that depositions "may be taken before any person, at any time or place,
upon any notice, and in any manner ... ." The second portion
of Rule 29 permits the parties to modify the other methods of
discovery, except that certain stipulations extending time limitations require court approval. The comparable Customs Court
Rule seemingly allows the parties even greater leeway:
RULE 7.1 STIPULATIONS REGARDING DEPOSITIONS AND
DISCOVERY PROCEDURE
Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties, by written stipulation filed with the clerk of the court: (1) may modify the procedures provided by these rules as to permit other methods of
discovery; and (2) may take any deposition provided for in these
rules before any person, at any time or place, upon any notice, and
when so taken such3 deposition may be used in the same manner as
other depositions
In the Customs Court, the parties may even stipulate to extend
the time limitations of the discovery rules.
This particular disparity 14 in the courts' rules highlights the
crux of discovery abuse in the Customs Court. The true abuse
in that court is not "over" discovery or resistance to discovery,
as in the district courts, but delay in discovery and failure to
13. Cusw. CT. R. 7.1 (1976).
14. There is another distinction. The Customs Court Rule provides that
the written stipulation be filed with the clerk of the court while the federal
rule does not. On the other hand, both rules commence: "Unless the court
orders otherwise. ..."
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prosecute. Of course, this rule distinction only underscores the
abuse and is not the core of the problem. In practice, the parties
may stipulate to extend time, but a judge of the court usually
issues an order.
Despite such authorization for depositions by telephone
upon stipulation of the parties, the technique has not often been
utilized. The new rule as adopted by the Customs Court, however, allows depositions by telephone upon court order and provides:
The parties may stipulate in writing or the court may upon motion order that a deposition be taken by telephone. For the purposes of this rule and rule 7.6 [infra], a deposition taken by
telephone is taken at the place5 where the deponent is to answer
questions propounded to him.'
As forwarded by the Standing Committee to the Judicial
Conference for consideration, allowance for deposition by telephone would appear as a new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
30(b) (7). If approved in its present form, the addition to the existing rule on Deposition Upon Oral Examination would read as
follows:
The parties may stipulate in writing or the court may upon motion order that a deposition be taken by telephone. For the pur-

poses of this rule and Rules 28(a), 37(a)(1), 37(b)(1) and 45(d), a
deposition taken by telephone is taken in the district and at the
place where the deponent is to answer questions propounded to
16
him.
This rule and the Customs Court Rule are identical except that
the latter omits three references to other rules which are inapplicable to a court with national jurisdiction.' 7 Proposed Federal Rule (30)(b)(7) also refers to Rule 28(a), relating to
"Persons Before Whom Depositions May Be Taken." While the
comparable Customs Court Rule 7.6 varies only slightly from the
federal rule, once again due to the nationwide jurisdiction dis15. CUST. CT. R. 7.3(b) (6) (1976). Rule 7.3 is the general Customs Court
Rule for Depositions Upon Oral Examination.
16. REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supra note 10.
17. Cited Federal Rule 37(a) (1) concerns the "appropriate court" in
which to move for an order compelling discovery: "An application for an
order to a party may be made to the court in which the action is pending, or,
on matters relating to a deposition, to the court in the district where the
deposition is being taken. . . ." Rule 37(b)(1) pertains to sanctions imposed by the "Court in District Where Deposition is Taken" for failure to
comply with a discovery order. Rule 45(d) refers to subpoenas issued "by
the clerk of the district court for the district in which the deposition is to be
taken .... ." In a national court like the Customs Court, this dilemma of
whether to turn for deposition assistance to the court in whose district the
discovery is held, or the district court where the action actually is litigated,
simply does not exist.
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tinction, this reference was retained in the new Customs Court
Rule 7.3(b) (6).
The reason for this retention, and the second sentence of
Rule 7.3(b) (6), is twofold. Maintaining the reference clarifies a
possible ambiguity as to where the deposition is actually taking
place. Both the Customs Court Rule and the Federal Rule indicate that the oath in a telephone deposition will be administered
at the deponent's end of the telephone line. Furthermore, the
reference specifies that the transcription of testimony should
take place there as well.
The Standing Committee's advisory note explained the significance of proposed Federal Rule 30(b) (7): "Depositions by
telephone are now authorized by Rule 29 upon stipulation of the
parties. The amendment authorizes that method by order of the
court."'1 8 The greatest significance of depositions by telephone
for the Customs Court, and probably the district courts, may
have been overlooked in the advisory note. The mere specification of a distinct subdivision concerning depositions by telephone undoubtedly will encourage the method's use.
Since the Customs Court has nationwide jurisdiction, the
potential implications of depositions by telephone, such as the
time, cost, and inconvenience savings for parties, witnesses, attorneys, and even the court's judges, may be especially great.
For those attorneys who fear that the deponent's demeanor, a
critical element in an oral deposition, will be missing, and their
follow-up queries will be less effective, note that the rule does
not preclude, and all the rules taken together encourage, the use
of a television-telephone hook-up, "picture-phone." 19 In fact,
18. REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFt, supra note 10. Note that originally

deposition by telephone was proposed as the concluding sentence to FED.
R. Crv. P. 30(b)(1):
(b) Notice of Examination: General Requirements; Special Notice; Non-Stenographic Recording; Production of Documents and
Things; Deposition of Organization.
(1) . . . A notice may provide for the taking of testimony by tele-

phone, but the court in which the action is pending may, on motion of
any party, require that the deposition be taken in the presence of the
deponent.

77 F.R.D. 613, 630 (1978). At this early date, FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b) ended:
(7) For the purposes of this rule, and Rules 28(a), 37(a)(1),
37(b) (1) and 45(d), a deposition is taken in the district and at the place
where the deponent is to answer questions propounded to him.
77 F.R.D. 613, 632 (1978). For reasons stated in the text, the version adopted
by the Customs Court is preferable.
19. "Picturephone," the telecommunications system that televises an
actual phone conversation, was developed by American Telephone and
Telegraph Company. The system has been utilized just once in a transcontinental deposition, in a pending action in the Supreme Court of New York,
Kings County, in which the New York Telephone Company is one of numer-
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this consideration was contemplated by the A.B.A. in their Discovery Report in which this comment appears: "The Committee
intends, by the use of the word 'telephone' to embrace any other
recognized form of telecommunications between distant
20
points."
THE DISCOVERY CONFERENCE

Discovery Abuse
Possibly an even greater tool against discovery abuse is the
discovery conference. When the much-respected Committee on
Federal Courts of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York reported on the proposed Discovery Conference Rule, they
prefaced their approval with the observation that "few would
dispute the almost axiomatic proposition that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the manner in which discovery is
typically conducted today in the Federal courts."' 21 Perhaps the
most colorful appraisal is one by Judge Ruggero Aldisert of the
Third Circuit: "The average litigant is overdiscovered, overinterrogatoried, and overdeposed-as a result, he is overcharged,
overexpensed, and overwrought. '22 Knowledge of the abuse of
discovery is so widespread that this specific topic was even re23
cently aired on the Op-Ed page of The New York Times.
ous defendants. Glaser v. New York Tel. Co., Index No. 57776/74. A photograph of the picturephone in operation appeared in the National Law

Journalarticle on the case. Nat'l L.J., Dec. 4, 1978, at 9. See also 181 N.Y.L.J.
1(1978).
20. See note 10 supra.
21. Committee on Federal Courts Report on the Proposed Discovery
Conference Rule of the N.Y.C.B.A.; accord, Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse
and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1978); see Becker, Modern Discovery.: Promoting Efficient Use and Preventing Abuse of Discovery in the Roscoe
Pound Tradition, 78 F.R.D. 267 (1978).

22. Committee on Federal Courts Report on the Proposed Discovery
Conference Rule of the N.Y.C.B.A.
23. Subrin, The Law and The Rules, The N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1979, at 37,
col. 4. The author, a professor at Northeastern University School of Law

who is writing a historical analysis of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
commented:
The discovery rules permit each side to compel the other to answer
hundreds, sometimes thousands, of questions under oath before trial.
Discovery can lead to important information, but often it takes years,
seriously disrupts the lives of non-lawyer participants, and costs a fortune.
Applying the rules to all cases, big and small, has proved disastrous. The ease of starting a case, launching into discovery, and hoping
for a settlement prompts questionable litigation. Small disputes quickly becomes wars. Partners, associates, paralegals, secretaries, office
managers, experts, photocopying machines, magnetic tapes and computers stand like platoons poised to attack, defend and counterattack.
Clients pay for the arms race.
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Essentially, in federal practice, this abuse materializes in
two incarnations-"overdiscovery," as pithily described by
Judge Aldisert, and discovery "resistance," overuse of protective
motions. This discovery abuse dichotomy constituted the analytical foundation for the most recent pretrial study by the Federal Judicial Center. 24 Interestingly, the researchers concluded
that overdiscovery-type abuse, much more than resistance
abuse, mandated prompt judicial intervention.
These discovery abuses are not as prevalent before the Customs Court. Here, the result is similar, but yet the cause is very
different. The problem is not overuse or resistance, but procrastination and delay.
Certainly one reason for overdiscovering in the district
courts may be to delay. That "Fifth Set of Interrogatories" may
very well not be directed at discovering new information, but
may be interposed to win time. Similarly, the underlying purpose of resistance may also be a delay tactic. Such motions are
inherent in our adversarial jurisprudence.
However, in the customs field, delay exists with a life of its
own. For this reason, the acceptance in principle of early judicial intervention in discovery, manifested by adoption of the
Discovery Conference Rule, is especially significant. The new
Customs Court Rule 6.1(f) reads as follows:
Discovery Conference. At any time after the filing of a complaint the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear
before it for a conference on the subject of discovery. The court
shall do so upon request by the attorney for any party if the request
includes:
(1) A statement of the issues as they then appear;
(2) A proposed plan and schedule of discovery;
(3) Any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery;
(4) Any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and
(5) A statement showing that the attorney making the request has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing attorneys on the matters set forth in the request. Each party
and his attorney are under a duty to participate in good faith in the
framing of a discovery plan if a plan is proposed by the attorney for
any party. Notice of the request shall be served on all parties. Objections or additions to matters set forth in the request shall be
served not later than 10 days after service of the request.
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an order tentatively identifying the issues for discovery purposes, establishing a plan and schedule for discovery, setting limitations on
discovery, if any; and determining such other matters, including
the allocation of expenses, as are necessary for the proper manage24. B. BURKE & J. EBERSOLE,
eral Judicial Center, 1980).

DISCOVERY PROBLEMS IN CIVIL CASES

(Fed-
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ment of discovery in the action. An order may be altered or
amended whenever justice so requires.
Subject to the right of a party who properly requests a discovery conference to prompt convening of the conference, the court
may combine the discovery conference with a pretrial conference
authorized by Rule 9.3.25
Proposed Federal Rule 26(f) varies only slightly from this
Customs Court Rule. 26 The lengthier committee comments are
25. CUST. CT. R. 6.1(f). Essentially, the 1978 Federal Rule 26(f) draft, 77
F.R.D. 613 (1978), was similar. At that time, the contemplated rule included
the following paragraph: "The court may exercise powers under Title 28
US.C., Sec. 1927 and Rule 37(e) to impose sanctionsfor the failure of a party
or counsel without good cause to have cooperated in the framing of an appropriatediscovery plan by agreement." 77 F.R.D. 613, 625 (1978). The Customs Court ultimately placed a comparable paragraph in the sanctions rule.
See CUST. CT. R. 6.5(f). This solution is what the Standing Committee
finally proposed.
26. See REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supra note 10, at 332. There are
only two inconsequential differences between the proposed federal rule,
Rule 26(f) and the adopted Customs Court Rule. The first difference is that
Customs Court Rule 6.1(f) begins: "At any time after the filing of a complaint, the court may. . .

." This

variation simply reflects the fact that in

federal practice a civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint
(FED. R. Civ. P. 3), while in the Customs Court, most actions are (indeed,
prior to January 1, 1980, all actions were) commenced by the filing of a summons. The reason some civil actions now are commenced by the concurrent
filing of a summons and complaint lies in the new statute. E.g., The Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, supra note 8.
Since all actions in the Customs Court today are commenced by the
filing of a summons (and only certain types of action require the concurrent
fling of a complaint), one might think that the precise parallel to the proposed federal discovery conference rule should begin: "At any time after
the tiling of a summons, the court may. . . " Such a conclusion would be
erroneous because of the "Reserve File" procedure of the Customs Court.
CUST. CT. R. 14.6.

Under the "Reserve File" procedure, the filing of a summons, while
technically commencing the action, actually is only 'protective." Plaintiffs
have 180 days from the denial of their "protest" before the Customs Service
in which to "commence" their court action by filing a summons. Customs
Court Act of 1970, 28 U.S.C. § 1582 (1976). After such "commencement," the
action is placed in a "Reserve File" where it may remain for two years, unless the court extends the time. CUST. CT. R. 14.6(e).
During this two year or longer period, the plaintiff may file a complaint
or seek a court decision based upon an agreed statement of facts. CUST. CT.
R. 14.6(b)(1), (3). Plaintiff also may choose to "consolidate" or "suspend"
the action. CUST. CT. R. 14.6(b) (2). "Consolidation," comparable to Federal
Rule 42(a), is allowed under Customs Court Rule 10.3; "Suspension" is described in Customs Court Rule 14.7. See Rao, A Primeron Customs Courts
Practice,40 BROOK. L. REV. 581 (1974). The true commencement of the action, that is the time from which defendant must fie an answer (CusT. CT.
R. 4.7(a)), is the filing of the complaint. Note, however, that the defendant
may file a "Demand for a Complaint" (CusT. CT.R. 4.4(b)) at any time, but
this procedure has rarely, if ever, been utilized. Furthermore, this rule,
prior to its January 1 amendment was most unclear as to the time period in
which the demanded complaint had to be filed. Interestingly, as originally
proposed by the A.B.A., the discovery conference could be commenced only
"after the joinder of issue." See note 6 supra.
The second difference appears at the conclusion of the Discovery Con-
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helpful in understanding the Customs Court Rule. The Standing Committee's advisory note on contemplated Federal Rule
26(f) is the lengthiest explanation any proposed amendment is
afforded. 27 The crux of the note 28 is that the anticipated goal
ference Rule. The proposed federal rule conclusion permits the court to
"combine the discovery conference with a pretrial conference authorized by
Rule 16." The Customs Court Rule follows the language exactly except that
the reference to the pretrial conference is to Rule 9.3, the comparable Customs Rule. This simple numerical designation difference certainly does not
merit lengthy discussion, except for the fact that the two Pretrial Conference Rules are not the same. Aside from other differences, Federal Rule 16
contains an entire concluding paragraph not included in the Customs Court
Rule. That paragraph reads:
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the
pretrial conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the
agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered,
and which limits the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered controls
the subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice.
FED. R. Crv. P. 16; see CUST. CT. R. 9.3(c).
27. REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAPt, supra note 10, at 627.
28. Subdivision (f). This subdivision is new. There has been widespread criticism of abuse of discovery. The Committee has considered
a number of proposals to eliminate abuse, including a change in Rule
26(b) (1) with respect to the scope of discovery and a change in Rule
33(a) to limit the number of questions that can be asked by interrogatories to the parties.
The Committee believes that abuse of discovery, while very serious
in certain cases, is not so general as to require such basic changes in
the rules that govern discovery in all cases. A very recent study of discovery in selected metropolitan districts tends to support its belief. P.
CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JudicialControls and the Civil
Litigative Process: Discovery (Federal Judicial Center, 1978) [hereinafter referred to as CONNOLLY, DISCOVERY STUDY]. In the judgment of
the Committee, abuse can best be prevented by intervention by the
court as soon as abuse is threatened.
To this end this subdivision provides that counsel who has attempted without success to effect with opposing counsel a reasonable
program or plan for discovery is entitled to the assistance of the court.
It is not contemplated that requests for discovery conferences will
be made routinely. A relatively narrow discovery dispute should be resolved by resort to Rules 26(c) or 37(a) and if it appears that a request
for a conference is in fact grounded in such a dispute, the court may
refer counsel to those rules. If the court is persuaded that a request is
frivolous or vexatious, it can strike it. See Rules 11 and 7(a) (2). [Note
that no Federal Rule 7(a) (2) exists so the Standing Committee's citation is uncertain. Rule 7 concerns "PLEADINGS ALLOWED" so the
Committee's intention may merely have been to suggest that a motion
to strike a request on the grounds of frivolousness or vexatiousness is
contemplated.]
A number of courts routinely consider discovery matters in preliminary pretrial conferences held shortly after the pleadings are closed.
This subdivision does not interfere with such a practice. It authorizes
the court to combine a discovery conference with a pretrial conference
under Rule 16 if a pretrial conference is held sufficiently early to secure
judicial intervention in time to prevent or curb abuse.
REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supra note 10, at 627.
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underlying proposed subdivision (f) is the curbing of discovery
abuse. The Committee had considered restricting the number
of interrogatory questions that could be posed. However, it concluded that what abuse did exist did not demand such basic
29
changes.
As noted, however, "abuse" is of a different nature in the
customs field. Thus, the latent purpose of the discovery conference, as contemplated by the Customs Court's Rules Advisory
Committee 30 and judges, is significantly different from that expressed by the Standing Committee.
That overdiscovery and resistance to disclosure is simply
not a key issue in the Customs Court is demonstrated by an examination of cases. In nine years since the modern Customs
Court Rules were adopted on October 1, 1970, 31 only some fifty
Customs Rules Decisions have concerned discovery questions.
In 1979, only three reported cases pertained to discovery. 32 In
Fruehauf Corp. v. United States,33 Judge Newman denied the
Government's motion to compel discovery, largely on the
ground of irrelevancy. In the two other cases, motions for pro34
tective orders were denied.
Customs Court Rules, to a somewhat lesser extent than the
federal rules, 35 offer a variety of alternatives for resolution of
discovery disputes. Rule 6.5 provides sanctions for failure to
make discovery. The new Customs Court Rule is similar to Fed29. Id.
30. The Customs Court Committee on Rules is chaired by Judge James
L. Watson. The other members are Judges Herbert N. Maletz and Nils A.
Boe. The Court Advisory Committee consisted of leading practitioners in
the customs field and high-ranking government attorneys.
31. The rules have been revised ten times, including the most recent
amendments. Further revision is contemplated if S. 1654, supra note 2,
passes. Only two revisions prior to the recent one concerned discovery, and
both times there were only minor changes.
32. See, e.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. United States, Cust. B. &Dec. Vol. 13, No.
32, at 59, Cust. C.R.D. 79-12 (1979); SCM Corp. v. United States (Brother
Int'l Corp., Party-in-Interest), 473 F. Supp. 791 (Cust. Ct. 1979); Airco, Inc. v.

United States, 468 F. Supp. 1327 (Cust. Ct. 1979).
33. Cust. B. & Dec. Vol. 13, No. 32, at 59, C.R.D. 79-12 (1979) (the court
also discussed res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the law of the case).
34. E.g., Airco, Inc. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1327 (Cust. Ct. 1979);
SCM Corp. v. United States (Brother Int'l Corp., Party-in-Interest), 473 F.
Supp. 791 (Cust. Ct. 1979).
35. The real difference lies in the area of sanctions. Compare FED. R.
Crv. P. 37 with recently adopted Customs Court Rule 6.5. Note particularly
the absence of an attorney's fees sanction in the latter rule. The reason for
this omission is that in the Customs Court the defendant always has been
the Government, and attorney's fees may not be awarded against the
United States. Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646, 62 Stat. 973, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1966);
see NAACP v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The judges were unwilling to adopt a rule with such one-sided application.
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eral Rule 37. Customs Court Rule 6.1(c), now identical to Federal Rule 26(c), authorizes the entry of "protective orders."
Customs Court Rule 7.3(d) on "Motions to Terminate or Limit
Examination" is virtually identical 36 to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 30(d).
Yet the 1979 example, that these rules were dealt with but
three times in customs opinions, is not, in fact, unusual. Indeed,
while the same general principles of broad discovery do guide
the Customs Court 37 and district courts, the granting of a protective order 3 8 seems to occur much less frequently in the Customs
Court.
A protective order is rarely granted. One recent case where
such an order was partially granted, however, was the continuing trial of Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States.39 The circumstances were most unusual. The litigants included Charles
Colson, H.R. Haldeman, Jeb Magruder, and others. Edward
Bennett Williams represented John Connally. The underlying
36. Compare CUST. CT. R. 7.3(d) with FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d). The only
variation is the internal reference to another court rule. However, in this
instance, just the numerical designation of the cited rule differs, not the
rule's substance.
37. CUST. CT. R. 6.1(b) provides: "(1) Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action ..
38. Rule 6.1(c) provides:
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by any party or by the person
from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court
may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including, but not limited to, one or more of the following
(1) that the discovery not be had;
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and
conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery
other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of
the discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition, after being sealed, be opened only by order
of the court;
(7) that a trade secret, or confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; or
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the
court.
39. 453 F. Supp. 897 (Cust. Ct. 1978); see Michelin Tire Corp. v. United
States, 469 F. Supp. 270 (Cust. Ct.), app. dismissed sub nom. United States
v. Watson, 603 F.2d 192 (C.C.P.A. 1979); Note, 6 J.L. & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 237
(1974). The court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the trial
continues today.
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cause of action in the case involves Michelin's contesting of the
denial by the Government of its protest against the assessment
of countervailing duties on imports of its radial tires from Canada. The case centers on Michelin's claim that the Government's decision was improperly influenced by payments made
by American tire manufacturers. The material sought in discovery included information which had been before the grand jury
investigation conducted by the Watergate Special Prosecution
Force.
Judge Watson generally ordered discovery, stating:
The court finds no justification for requiring a demonstration of
particularized need or any other exceptional standard of discovery
in this matter. Although there is somewhat of a dearth of authority
in this area of the law there is a definite distinction made between
discovery for the purpose of learning what occurred before the
grand jury and discovery,
for its own sake, of materials which were
40
before the grand jury.
After overruling this objection, and dispensing with attorney-client and work-product privilege arguments, the objections to disclosure were overruled.
However, Judge Watson added that "[tihe court is further
of the opinion that because these materials are associated with
events of recent notoriety which remains the focus of intense
public interest and could become the object of injudicious use,
they should be discovered within the confines of a protective order."'41 He then elaborately described the safeguards that would
be imposed on the discovery.
More typical among those rare cases where a protective or42
der is granted was Gehrig, Hoban & Co., Inc. v. United States.
At issue was the Government's motion, pursuant to the then effective Rule 6.5(b) (2), 43 to impose sanctions for plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with the court's previous order to compel
discovery. The court carefully traced the plaintiff's recalcitrance
in discovery. In pertinent part, this history included:
It appears that on December 24, 1974 defendant served interrogatories directed to plaintiff pursuant to Rule 6.3 .... On July 1,
40. Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 897 (Cust. Ct.
1978).
41. Id.
42. 76 Cust. Ct. 277, C.R.D. 76-3 (1976).
43. Customs Court Rule 6.5(b) (2) read:
If any party or a person designated under Rule 7.3(b) (4) to testify

on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under paragraph (a) of this rule, the court
may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just. ...

The rule adopted on October 26, 1979 now largely conforms the Customs

Court provision with
main.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2), but significant differences re-
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1975 (which was more than 6 months after service of the interrogatories), defendant moved pursuant to Rule 6.5 for an order compelling plaintiff to answer said interrogatories. On July 9, 1975, a
conference was held in chambers pursuant to plaintiff's request
concerning the discovery proceedings and proposals by plaintiff for
disposition of this and other related cases. On July 18, 1975, plaintiff moved for an order extending its time to September 15, 1975 in
which to answer defendant's motion to compel discovery. This latter extension of time was granted over defendant's objections by an
order dated July 29, 1975. On September 15, 1975, plaintiff filed a
partial opposition to defendant's motion to compel discovery; raising for the first time objections to certain interrogatories; and thereafter defendant filed a reply to the aforesaid opposition on
November 14, 1975. On December 1, 1975, plaintiff was ordered to
answer defendant's propounded interrogatories within 60 days.
Additionally, the order directed that:
".. . [SIhould plaintiff not fully comply with this Court's order,
then plaintiff shall be precluded from either introducing at trial of
the issues in this action, or presenting in conjunction with the
filing of a dispositive motion herein, any evidence concerning the
information sought to be elicited by defendant's interrogatories.
...
The present motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule
6.5(b) (2) was filed on April 29, 1976. . .. "44
The court reached the obvious conclusion that the re45
quested information had not been provided to the defendant.
Yet the court ordered that "[u] nder all the facts and circumstances, defendant's motion for sanctions under the foregoing
rule should be granted unless plaintiff provides the requested
information. ' 46 In the order, plaintiff was granted an additional
47
sixty days to comply.
Of course, these approximate statistics and case discussions
44. Gehrig, Hoban & Co., Inc. v. United States, 76 Cust. Ct. at 278, C.R.D.
76-3 (1976).
45. Id. at 281.
46. Id.
47. Id. Subsequently, plaintiff answered some of the interrogatories.
As to others, plaintiff moved to vacate the sanctions imposed in C.R.D. 76-3.
The opinion stated:
Candidly, this Court is greatly anguished by the substantial time,
labor and expense on plaintiff's part necessitated by the broad scope of
the propounded interrogatories. But on the other hand, the scope of the
information requested by defendant is merely reflective of the broad
scope of plaintiff's claims and the apparent complexity of the issues.
Gehrig, Hoban & Co., Inc. v. United States, 77 Cust. Ct. 176, 178, C.R.D. 76-11
(1976). The court concluded that the plaintiff had not properly responded to
certain interrogatories. Still, "under all the facts and circumstances, and in
view of the good faith efforts demonstrated by plaintiffs," the court granted
plaintiff an additional sixty days to supplement its answers. Id.
So far as the court record discloses, no supplemental response was filed
(although the parties did enter into a court-approved stipulation). Indeed,
on October 28, 1978, the judge issued an order to show cause why the cause
should not be dismissed. In 1979, the court files disclosed that the parties
appeared to have reached a settlement.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 13:225

do not prove there is little discovery-resistance abuse in the customs field. But they do strongly indicate that such abuse is not
as prevalent as in the district courts. Accordingly, sanctions,
protective orders, and other control mechanisms are rarely employed. Admittedly though, some discovery dispositions may
have been accomplished via unpublished orders. Authors of a
district court discovery study which considered "protecting motions" confessed this and another statistical difficulty:
[T] he rule provisions for protecting motions turn on events not recorded in the court files-primarily annoying, embarrassing, or oppressive requests; unduly burdensome or expensive requests; or
bad faith by the requesting party. We have no data to measure the
extent of such conduct by requesting parties. Consequently, we
could not measure the actual protecting motions against those that
the number of promight have been sought, nor could we measure
48
tecting motions that were frivolously sought.
Other Discovery Mechanisms
As noted, the chief problem confronting the Customs Court
in this area is prodding the parties to commence and pursue discovery. A mere comparison of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the Customs Court Rules would suggest that judges in
the latter court exercise greater supervision, and thus would
have less difficulty, in controlling pretrial practice. Only the one
contrast mentioned, the comparison between Federal Rule 29
and Customs Court Rule 7.1, signifies otherwise.
As to depositions upon oral examination for example, Customs Court Rule 7.3(a), prior to the rules' change effective January 1, 1980, read: "When Depositions May Be Taken: [Bly leave
of court upon motion, any party may take the testimony of any
person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examination. . . -49 By contrast, Federal Rule (30) (a) reads: "[A] ny
party may take the testimony of any person, including a party,
by deposition upon oral examination .... ,,5o "Leave of court" is
required only if "the plaintiff seeks to take a deposition prior to
the expiration of 30 days after service of the summons and complaint upon any defendant. 5 1 Even in this circumstance, there
are two exceptions when leave of court is not required: if the
48. CONNOLLY, DISCOVERY STuDY, supra note 28, at 105.
49. CusT. CT. R. 7.3(a).

50.

FED.

R. Crv. P. 30(a). Note that this rule begins: "After commence-

ment of the action. . .

."

The Customs Court Rule commences: "After the

filing of a complaint. . . ." For an explanation of the deviation, see note 18
supra. Note that prior to the recent amendments to the rules, Customs
Court Rule 7.3 began: "After the fling of an answer... " (emphasis added).
51. FED. R. Crv. P. 30(a).
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defendant has already sought discovery or if "special notice" is
circumstances subsegiven to all parties to the action, under the
52
rules.
federal
the
in
delineated
quently
Nevertheless, Customs Court "control" of depositions upon
oral examination has been illusory. In practice, "leave of court
upon motion" almost always proceeds by consent of the parties
with only perfunctory, if any, judicial supervision.
On the one occasion when this "leave of court" provision of
Customs Court Rule 7.3 was interpreted, Judge Watson downplayed any significance to the imperative. In Intercontinental
Fibres,Inc. v. United States,53 the Judge, Chairman of the Court
Rules Committee, construed the phrase: "The requirement for
leave of court in this situation has no parallel in the federal rules
and as between its representing a formal notice requirement or
a complete departure from general federal practice, I must
choose the former. '54 In any case, Customs Court Rule 7.3, effective January 1, 1980, obviates this "leave of court" distinc55
tion.
Thus, the discovery conference may be seized upon by
judges to oversee the timing as well as the substance of discovery. Certainly such control falls within the Standing Committee's expressed language, if not their intent.5 6 Under Customs
Court Rule 6.1(f) (2) [proposed Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (2)], the at52.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 30(b)(2).

53. 352 F. Supp. 952, 69 Cust. Ct. 337, C.R.D. 72-27 (1972).
54. Id. at 954, 69 Cust. Ct. at 340.
55. Prior to the recent adoption of the amendments and additions to the

rules, the Customs Court had no "special notice" provision comparable to

that contained in Federal Rule 30(b)(2). That omission has been rectified
by Customs Court Rule 7.3(b) (7).

The only significant deviation between Federal Rule 30(b) (2) and the

Customs Court Rule reflects the nationwide jurisdiction of the Customs
Court. The Federal Rule provides that: "Leave of court is not required for
the taking of a deposition by plaintiff if the notice (A) states that the person

to be examined is about to go out of the district where the action is pending
and more than 100 miles from the place of trial, or is about to go out of the
United States . . . ." CUST. CT. R. 7.3(b) (7) omits much of this language:
"Leave of court is not required for the taking of a deposition by plaintiff if
the notice (A) states that the person about to be examined is about to go
out of the United States. ..."
The other difference between these two rules (aside from the internal
technical numerical one, i.e. (b) (2) versus (b) (7)) is that the Federal Rule
contains one additional sentence: "The sanctions provided by Rule 11 are
applicable to the [attorney's]

certification

[that to the best of his

knowledge, information, and belief, the statement as to the impending un-

availability of the person to be examined, and the facts supporting that

statement, are true]." The explanation for the omission of this sentence in
Customs Court Rule 7.3(b) (7) is simply that the Customs Court has no

sanction provision comparable to that of Federal Rule 11 on signing of

pleadings.
56. See

REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFT,supra note

10, at 330.
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torney seeking a discovery conference must include in his request: "A proposed plan and schedule of discovery." The
attorney must also set
forth "any limitations proposed to be
57
placed on discovery.
Had the Customs Court published an explanatory note, they
probably would have omitted the Standing Committee's statement that "lilt is not contemplated that requests for discovery
conferences will be made routinely. ' 58 While the United States
as a defendant may want to speed cases along, international organizations may repeatedly request discovery conferences.5 9
The opportunity to control the commencement and timing
of discovery impressed the entire court. This attitude is demonstrated by their revision of another rule. Prior to the recent revisions, Customs Court Rule 6.1(d) read:
Sequence and Timing of Discovery: Unless the court, upon mo-

tion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used
in any sequence; and the fact that a party is conducting discovery,
whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any
other party's discovery: Provided, that no measure
for discovery
60
may be initiatedprior to the filing of an answer.

There had been some prior discussion about retaining the
original rule and simply changing the last sentence to read:
"prior to the filing of a complaint." This plan was rejected not
because the substance was troublesome-in fact, this was what
was intended. 61 Instead the court sought to achieve complete
uniformity with the federal rules, an overall objective the draftsmen strove for. Besides, the proposed rule concerned the timing
and sequence of discovery. No discovery would be initiated
under Rule 6.1(d). Each method of discovery had individually
been keyed to the filing of the complaint.
The full court reported out the following Rule 6.1(d):
Sequence and Timing of Discovery: Unless the court, upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used
in any sequence; and the fact that a party is conducting discovery,
57. CUST. CT. R. 6.1(f) (3); see Proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (3),

REVISED

PRELIMINARY DRAFr, supra note 10, at 330.
58. REVISED PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 10, at 332.

59. See Letter from I.T.C. General Counsel Russell N. Shewmaker by
Deputy General Counsel Jeffrey M. Lang to Joseph E. Lombardi, Clerk for
the United States Customs Court (October 11, 1979) [hereinafter Letter
from I.T.C. 1. (Mr. Lang intimated that the International Trade Commission
would routinely request a discovery conference).
60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (when the full court convened October 26,
1979, the proposed Custom Court Rule 6.1(d) and Rule 26(d) read verbatim).
61. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
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whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any
other party's discovery: Provided, that no discovery may be initiated prior to the filing of a complaint,
62 or later than 90 days after

issue is joined, without leave of court.

Thus, the judges restated what the other rules make apparent, that no discovery may be commenced prior to the filing of a
complaint. The new proviso adds, however, that discovery may
be commenced before this filing, with leave of court. This portion of the proviso may have been necessary due to a seeming
flaw in another aspect of the court's rules. The Customs Court
has no provision comparable to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
27(a) which concerns Depositions Before Action. Customs
Court Rule 7.2,63 "Depositions to Perpetuate Testimony," appears similar, but is not comparable. The critical incongruence
is that Rule 7.2 exclusively concerns pending actions. So, this
addendum on pre-complaint discovery may ameliorate Rule
7.2's deficiency. 64 In any case, the possibility of earlier discovery
under Rule 6.1(d) would appear to also apply to discovery conferences.
What is more important though is the strong indication, by
the judges' inclusion in Rule 6.1(d) of a specific time constraint,
that they were concerned with the timing and control potential
offered by the Discovery Conference Rule. There is no question
that discovery cutoff dates affect judicial control of overall discovery times. 65 Yet there is no comparable existing or proposed
federal rule. Indeed, the Standing Committee specifically rejected a comparable A.B.A. numerical limitation recommendation-that the number of interrogatories servable on a party be
limited to thirty, unless leave of court was obtained. 66 Conceivably, the 90-day requirement will lead to unnecessary litigation.
In any case, many of the judges undoubtedly will use the Discovery Conference Rule to gain greater supervision over their
calendars.
62. CUST. CT. R. 6.1(d) (emphasis added).
63. Rule 7.2 remained untouched during the recent rule revisions, and,
indeed, has remained unaltered since its adoption on August 3, 1970.
The Standing Committee proposed no change in the Federal Rule,
which has not been significantly altered in over thirty years. Extremely minor revisions have been made on December 29, 1948, and March 1, 1971.
64. This deficiency in Customs Court Rule 7.2(a) (1) appears even more
pronounced when one considers the "Reserve File" rules of the court. See
note 18 supra.
65. See CONNOLLY, DISCOVERY STUDY, supra note 28, at 52.
66. PRELIMINARY DRAFr OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CrvL PROCEDURE, 77 F.R.D. 613, 627 (1978).
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The Need for Discovery

At least one governmental agency, the International Trade
67
Commission, now statutorily subject to Customs Court review,
has intimated that a discovery conference may be requested to
sidetrack all discovery at the very commencement of the action. 68 The Commission's argument, seemingly strengthened by
the Trade Agreements Act, is that the court's review is limited,
in certain cases, to consideration only of the administrative record.69 This delineated record,70 the argument continues, constitutes the record-exclusively. Thus, absent an allegation of
fraud or the omission of a legislatively itemized portion of the
record, discovery would be both unnecessary and inappropriate
71
in certain cases.
The Office of the General Counsel of the I.T.C. urged adoption of a rule entirely eliminating discovery in section 516A [of
the Tariff Act of 1930] proceedings. 72 According to the General
Counsel: "Discovery, therefore, can only serve to waste the
Court's and the parties' time when they should be concentrating
on answers focused on the key issues in the cases and on motions for summary judgment supported by informed excerpts
from the agency record.17 3 In the words of the Deputy General
Counsel of the I.T.C.:
The reason that the Trade Agreements Act by implication suggests that there is to be no discovery is that it finally and firmly
limits the matters which the Customs Court may consider [in] sec67. See note 18 supra (under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979).
68. Note that the court prior to passage of the Trade Agreements Act
had deemed the Commission subject to review. See SCM Corp. v. United
States (Brother Int'l Corp., Party-in-Interest), 450 F. Supp. 1158, 80 Cust. Ct.
226, C.R.D. 78-2 (1978).

69. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(2) (1979); see §§ 516(a)(1) (c)&
(a)and 777(c) (2)of the Tariff Act of 1930.
70. The "Record for Review" isset forth in28 U.S.C. § 2635(b) (2); see

Hugo Stinnes Steel & Metals Co.v. United States, 453 F.Supp. 94 (Cust.Ct.
1978) (not limited to the administrator's record).
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 2632(d) which provides: "The Customs Court, by
rule, may consider any new ground in support of a civil action if the new
ground (1) applies to the same merchandise that was the subject of the protest; and (2) is related to the same administrative decision or decisions
listed in section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, that were contested in the protest."
72. Letter from I.T.C., supra note 59 (locatable in the Law Division of
the United States Customs Court to whose attention the letter was called).
73. Letter from I.T.C., supra note 59. Furthermore, the Office of the
General Counsel urged the addition of the following sentence to Customs
Court Rule 6.1: "Notwithstanding the foregoing, confidential or privileged
status accorded to any document, comment or information contained in any
agency record, filed with the court in accordance with section 516A of the
Tariff Act of 1930 shall be preserved in any such action." Letter from I.T.C.,
supra note 59.
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tion 516A actions. In these cases, the Court is required to hold unlawful any determination which is (in section 516A(a) cases)
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law," or (in section 516A(b) cases) "unsupported
by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law." These are words of art drawn from the scope of
review in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. Section 706, plainly intended to require the agency on the one hand to
produce a complete record of the matter before the agency for decision, and on the other hand to limit the Court in making its determination of lawfulness to whether the agency acted lawfully in
respect of the record that the agency produces. Since the agency
record is the key to applying these standards, discovery is unnecessary and in fact uncommon under the APA. Rather, such actions
are resolved by proceeding directly to the determination of the issues on the basis of the record that the agency produces. In the
Commission's case, it is considering elaborate rules for accumulating the agency record, reflecting a74 good faith attempt to implement
this general pattern of litigation.
As to the Discovery Conference Rule specifically, the Office
of the General Counsel wrote:
We have a limited support for this rule. We are sure that in
cases arising under statutes other than 516A, discovery conferences
may be a useful device. To that extent we, of course, support the
rule. Furthermore, if the Court promulgates rules such as the one
permitting discovery before answer, then the discovery conference
rule is necessary, since it would enable the agencies concerned in
section 516A actions to point out the futility of discovery in these
actions and cause the Court to limit it or to eliminate it completely.
far exHowever, our lack of enthusiasm for pre-answer discovery
75
ceeds our support of the discovery conference rule.
Two Customs Court decisions which have considered discovery in the context of review of agency determinations conflict. The issue may be moot now, however, since both were
decided prior to the effective date of the Trade Agreements
Act. 76 In SCM Corp. v. United States,77 Chief Judge Re, in an
extensive opinion, protected certain I.T.C. documents as within
the "executive privilege." The Chief Judge wrote:
74. Id. These I.T.C. procedures have been published. Procedures for
the Conduct of Investigations of Whether Injury to Domestic Industries Results from Imports Sold at Less Than Fair Value or from Subsidized Exports to the United States. 19 C.F.R. §§ 201, 207 (1979). See particularly
§§ 207.2(f), 207.50 et seq.
75. Letter from I.T.C., supra note 59. For a better understanding of
"rules such as the one permitting discovery before answer," see the court
rules prior and after January 1, 1980 and the textual discussion on Customs
Court Rule 6.1(d).
76. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2503 & 1671 (1979 Supp.).
Pub. L. No. 96-39 (1979), §§ 2(a), 107 (the effective date most probably is January 1, 1980).
77. 473 F. Supp. 791 (Cust. Ct. 1979) (Brother Int'l Corp., Party-in-Interest).
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In summary, the Chairman of the International Trade Commission, in claiming privilege and resisting disclosure, by his affidavit
and the description of the materials, has demonstrated to the court
that the documents in question are advisory, and contain no severable factual information. The documents in question, representing
processes of government," are protected against
"pure deliberative
78
disclosure.
In Airco, Inc. v. United States,79 Judge Scovel Richardson
permitted discovery where the Government specifically sought
protection from the plaintiff's inquiries into matters not part of
the administrative record. 80 The case arose in the context of a
negative countervailing duty determination by the Secretary of
the Treasury.
The Judge wrote:
Discovery is a useful tool with which to amplify an otherwise
meager administrative record. Indeed, its employment by plaintiff
prior to the instant motions has resulted in the identification of individuals whose activities in government service place them, in the
court's judgment, in such high levels of policymaking endeavor in
relation to the determination under review as to make them privy
to relevant factual material, if it exists, and characterize them as
"agents". . . and, therefore, amenable to additional discovery procedures in such capacity.
The proposed discovery does not, in the court's view, exceed
permissible limits or warrant protective measures at this point.
Defendant's fears in this regard are at best anticipatory and premature, and certainly not grounded in any factual basis. Even factual
material contained in deliberative memoranda is discoverable if
susceptible to severance from its context. [citation omitted] And
should any improper question be propounded during the examinations, defendant's remedies are ample and accessible at such a
time.
For the reasons stated, plaintiff's motion is granted and defendant's cross-motion is denied. 81
Of course, in addition to the statutory mandate as to the record
83
82
on review, the standard of review has also been legislated.
This legislative statement may affect the vitality of Airco.
CONCLUSION
The discovery conference and deposition by telephone
adopted by the judges of the Customs Court, soon to be appended to the federal rules, may mark significant milestones in
civil procedure. They should aid the Customs Court even more
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 799; see Weir v. United States, 508 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1974).
468 F. Supp. 1327 (Cust. Ct. 1979).
Id. at 1330.
Id.
See notes 67-74 and accompanying text supra.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39 (1979).
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than the district courts. If deposition by telephone proves effective, obviously the impact will be even greater on this court with
nationwide jurisdiction.
The implication of the Discovery Conference Rule is less
clear. For the district courts, if the new rule assists in curbing
the increasing abuse of discovery, clearly the innovation will be
deemed a positive one. If, however, proposed Federal Rule 26(f)
only promotes litigation, and in the short run that probably will
be the outcome, then the discovery conference would be a
mixed blessing at best. This consideration is emphasized by the
fact that Federal Rule 16 could be interpreted to include the gist
of what proposed Rule 26(f) seeks to accomplish. Here too, the
benefits for the Customs Court, because pretrial procedural
rules are less developed and the discovery abuse is of a different
nature, should be greater than for the district courts.

